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The paper examines the ethical aspects of discounting during the preparation 
of intertemporal decisions, and the influence of this on the cost-benefit analysis 
of community investments. It focuses on the economic philosophy and ethical 
considerations that underlie discounting as a daily financial activity. The author 
attempts to resolve the apparent logical contradiction between the cardinal and 
discounted utilitarian ethical approaches. By analysing the preconditions related to 
the definition of the values of the parameters included in the Ramsey formula, it is 
presented that neither the social discount rate applied in the case of intertemporal 
investments nor the current practice of establishing the market discount rate used 
for investments representing a potential burden on the environment is suitable for 
the assessment of the long-term community investments and private investments 
burdening the environment.
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1. Introduction
Although economic and business decisions are seemingly about the future, in fact 
policy-makers are guided by a relatively static vision corresponding to or easily 
deducible from the present. This is the foreseeable and predictable future, where 
the cycles are repeated, trends continue, trend changes can be easily predicted, 
and disasters are moderate and negligible over the long run. By contrast, there are 
the situations which involve large, unpredictable changes even over the short run, 
and we do not know whether the scenario in store will be the one we imagined or 
something completely different. This second group also includes cases which involve 
such long-term periods of time the general conditions of which we are unable – or 
do not dare – to estimate. We tend to ignore the fact that the unforeseeable and 
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unpredictable future – which we instinctively identify with the very long term – may 
appear on our time horizon even within a few years.
Why is it important to differentiate between the two types of future? Because, 
when economists talk about decisions impacting the future – whether foreseeable 
or unforeseeable – almost instinctively rely on the same tool, i.e. on discounting. 
According to the classic economic approach we can talk about risk when we are 
able to quantify the respective factor, while in the case of uncertainty we are unable 
to measure the probability and/or the outcome is fully uncertain (Knight 1921). 
The daily practice of investment valuation conflicts with these two, theoretically 
easily differentiable, notions. Discounting involves cash flows, which means that 
somebody somehow – either on an “objective” or “subjective” basis (Bélyácz 
2010) – has already estimated the respective factor, be it the income earned in 
the 20th year as a result of the investment, or the rate of the inflation influencing 
the cost over the entire investment horizon. Neither of these are foreseeable, but 
nevertheless we estimate both of them to declare whether or not the investment 
will generate a return. And we try to clear up the uncertainties by discounting. 
Thus, discounting is an answer to the question “how to manage the future”, and 
at the same time it is an easily usable, practical guideline for the preparation of 
financial calculations. The general response provided by discounting sounds like 
this: let us try to treat it as the present, just reduce its value a little bit. What may 
be surprising for an outsider is that in the case of both the foreseeable and the 
seemingly foreseeable future, which may become unforeseeable at any moment, 
most of the theoretical and practical trains of ideas rely on the same solution.
The standard discounting methods are used routinely in the elaboration of policies 
and measures applicable to the foreseeable future. The mechanism of discounting 
is the same as that of compound interest. However, while compound interest may 
be reasonably conceivable for the experts over the short run, over the long run it 
can generate results which appear unrealistic even for such experts. Consider, for 
example, the fact that a sum of USD 1,000 invested 100 years ago at a compound 
interest rate of 5 per cent would be worth USD 131,501 today. The same example 
would not work with the Hungarian forint, since the bank of 100 years ago would no 
longer exist (which in the case of the USA would be realistic), and 100 years ago the 
currency was also different, since meanwhile currency replacements, hyperinflation, 
economic crises, political transformations and various other disasters added colour 
to the economic conditions of Hungary.
In the case of the unforeseeable future, discounting raises questions even for those 
who use it as daily practice, since such mechanical devaluation of the future raises 
the issue of conflicts between the present and future generations. Seeing that 
over the long run a change even in a relatively small discount rate can cause major 
differences in the valuation of future cash flows, we have a good reason to assume 
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that this calculation method is biased and it conflicts with our instincts, and perhaps 
also with common sense.
Discounting appears to be only as a secondary financial technical decision and its 
use is routine. It is exactly this lack of sophistication that conceals the fact that 
discounting and the discount rate fundamentally influence our decisions on the 
planning of investments necessary for the production public and private goods, 
and decide which investments should be implemented and which ones should be 
declared unprofitable.
The impact of discounting on the unforeseeable future can be best demonstrated 
by the cost-benefit analysis of measures related to climate change. Although we do 
not know the exact scenario in which climate change will materialise, we assume 
that it will generate losses both at the level of the individual national economies 
and globally. When Stern (2007), and a little bit later Nordhaus (2008), tried to 
take stock of these potential economic impacts, they used the same benchmark 
assumptions with regard to the impacts of the climate change, the determinant 
factors and key parameters of the economic system (Weisbach – Sunstein 2009). 
The largest difference between them is a seemingly minor technical issue, namely, 
the way they define the discount rate. Stern proposed a low, 1.4 per cent discount 
rate (later on he raised it to 2 per cent), while Nordhaus argued for a high, 5.5 
per cent discount rate. The two values represent two different assessment of the 
future. When using a discount rate of 1.4 per cent, the costs of climate change 100 
years later are 53-times higher than when using 5.5 per cent. 200 years later there 
is already a 2,800-fold difference (Weisbach – Sunstein 2009). The two authors 
propose different measures for preventing the impacts of climate change. Stern 
believes that immediate, expensive measures should be taken to reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases and prevent losses. By contrast, Nordhaus takes the position 
that no quick measures are needed since the very low discount rate underlying 
those is not compatible with today’s market conditions (Nordhaus 2006). In his 
opinion, a slow, gradual transformation of the energy framework is sufficient. Fast 
and instant measures are extremely expensive, offering relatively low profit.
2. Impact of discounting on projects with asymmetric cost structure
The discounting of the unforeseeable future is particularly interesting in the case of 
investments with a long life cycle, where the distribution of the costs and revenues 
during the service life is asymmetric. For example, when we evaluate certain energy 
production technologies, in calculating the net present value projects with high 
initial investment costs followed by low operation, maintenance and dismantling 
costs are disadvantaged compared to projects where the distribution of costs is 
more even. This difference systematically appears between investments based on 
renewable sources (wind, water, solar, geothermal) and fossil fuels (coal, gas, oil). 
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When this financial valuation is accompanied by a moral judgement, according to 
which fossil fuels are “bad” and renewables are “good”, everyone calls for aid to 
counterbalance the barriers to the renewable energies’ market entry. High subsidies 
are justified in the case of immature technologies in the phase of innovation, if 
society believes that it wants to change over to another energy paradigm. When 
these technologies become mature, i.e. they are able to generate electricity at the 
same or even lower price as the network price, or the investment in the respective 
project has already returned, and the subsidy can be already interpreted as a rent. 
This rent is unearned compensation, which prevents society from using its resources 
for the implementation of other innovations or other social goals.
When assessing the burdens on future generations, investments burdening 
the environment in the future, where the costs of dismantling are extremely 
high, represent a special case. Figure 1 shows that in the case of projects of 
different lifetimes what proportion of the dismantling costs should be taken into 
consideration for the purpose of calculating the net present value of the project 
when applying different discount rates.
Figure 1
Proportion of dismantling costs taken into consideration for the purpose of the 
financial valuation of the project
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If the valuation of the project is for a lifetime of ten years, we see on the top 
curve that upon using a 2 per cent discount rate, 82 per cent of the dismantling 
costs are taken into consideration for the purpose of financial valuation. (If this 
amount is HUF 1 billion, the net present value of this is HUF 800 million.) With an 
increase in the lifetime and/or the discount rate, the dismantling cost taken into 
consideration for the investment decision becomes increasingly negligible. There are 
a number of industries where dismantling costs are high, because the machinery, 
areas or buildings used for the investment cannot be utilised for other purpose 
and/or are harmful for the environment (e.g. shutdown of mines, power stations 
or chemical plants). In this case, when the lifetime planned for the long run, i.e. 
50–60 years, is accompanied by a discount rate of 4–5 per cent, it means that the 
burden of dismantling is hardly or not at all taken into consideration for the purpose 
of the investment decisions and we charge it to the future generation in full. In this 
case, uncertainty and ignorance of the future generations’ plans are combined. 
We are uncertain in respect of the future costs, but instead of admitting this, we 
opt for a seemingly “technical” method that makes the future events financially 
unimportant. The policy-makers making the final decision, including economic 
experts or politicians financing the investments, are usually not aware of the fact 
that the verdict declaring an investment profitable is substantially influenced by 
the choice of the discount rate.
In discounting the cash flows of the distant future, the correlation illustrated in 
the figure above always exists, irrespective of whether it is a private or public 
investment. The German nuclear power plants were private investments, while the 
investment in the Hungarian nuclear power plant was financed by the Hungarian 
state. Dismantling costs exist in both cases, and it is almost impossible to assess 
the magnitude of those, since the highly radioactive waste must be stored at safe 
locations for periods of several hundred thousand years. But even if we ignore the 
storage costs, the direct costs of dismantling, neutralisation and disposal alone 
involve such high amounts that will be paid not by the individual (private or public) 
companies, but by the society in both cases. According to the Expert Committee of 
Sciences operating under the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
preliminarily estimated costs of dismantling will not be covered by the reserves 
appropriated in the balance sheets of the German energy companies, which, by 
the way, for the time being represent only a commitment rather than realistically 
appropriated funds (BWE 2015). This example also shows that in the case of the 
intertemporal decisions – for 40–50 years or for an even longer time horizon – the 
discount rate has the same effect irrespective of whether it involves a public or 
private investment. In both cases, with a sufficiently high discount rate, the burden 
of dismantling is shifted to future generations, while projects are also implemented 
which with a very low or even zero discount rate would be regarded as financially 
unviable.
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3. Descriptive and prescriptive procedures for establishing the 
discount rate
The procedures applied for determining the optimal discount rate differ based on 
the type of project. There are various methods for identifying the discount rate 
both in the case of private investments and public investments which are deemed 
important by society but fail the test of general market conditions and payback 
criteria. Essentially, two methods can be differentiated. The first group includes 
the methods that calculate the discount rate based on the observation of certain 
economic processes (descriptive, positive methods), while in the second group the 
definition of the discount rate is governed by express moral principles (normative, 
prescriptive methods).
3.1. Observing the discounting habits of people
Through a number of experiments behavioural economics has established that 
people primarily prefer the present and very strongly discount anticipated future 
rewards. This behaviour characterises almost all living organisms and is not only 
a determinant of human behaviour. This high degree of individual impatience may 
also be attributable to the fact that we cannot be sure that we still will be alive 
when we are able to reap the future profit or bear the future costs (Lewandowsky 
et al. 2017). This is also supported by the analysis of Trostel and Taylor (2001), 
which is based on panel data of household consumption habits in the USA (Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics – PSID). The authors concluded that the willingness to 
discount is not constant in the various phases of human life, and the older people 
are (the closer they believe to be to death), the more inclined they are to discount 
the future more strongly.
The discounting willingness of people is not necessarily linear, as it does not assess 
all future events and consumption opportunities in the same way. The concept 
of hyperbolic discounting describes the phenomenon – observed in the case of 
savings, borrowing, or even with sports or drug addiction – that people use a future 
valuation pattern – which can be best depicted by a hyperbolic curve – according 
to which they are impatient when it comes down to the present (i.e. short term) 
and patient about the future (cf. Rambaud – Torrecillas 2006).
3.2. Discount rate determined based on the observation of capital markets and 
competitive market processes
For the purpose of determining the discount rate used for private investments, 
a large number of factors are taken into consideration, such as the corporate cost of 
capital in respect of both own and debt capital (Weighted Average Cost of Capital, 
WACC), the risks of the given project, the inflation impacts and other, industry-
specific systemic risks. Accordingly, in the practice of enterprises the determination 
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(in fact, the estimation) of the discount rate moves within relatively broad limits, 
depending on the size and capital structure of the company, the return on equity 
expected by the investors, the disposable liquid assets, as well as on the aptitude 
or strategic short-sightedness of the management (Jagannathan et al. 2016), and 
also on the common procedures in the respective country or what the respective 
decision-maker deems appropriate (cf. Szűcs 2014).
3.3. Social discount rate
It is necessary to determine the social discount rate, because there are long-term 
investments that are important for society’s long-term welfare or during the 
production of various public goods. The financial valuation of these with the usual 
discount rate established for private investments returns negative net present value, 
although their social net present value is positive (Tabi 2012).
Usually, four methods are applied for the definition of the discount rate used in the 
cost-benefit analysis performed for social investments.
•  The social time preference rate (STPR) shows the size of the future yield for which 
the society is willing to postpone its present consumption.
•  The calculation of the social opportunity cost (SOC), which reflects the costs of 
money markets (Tabi 2012; Tabi – Csutora 2011), comparing the two situations 
when the capital destined for the investment is used in the private or public sector.
•  The discount rate of those projects can be calculated with the use of the weighted 
average (WAM) where both the private and the public sectors are involved. This is 
the weighted average of the social time preference rate and the social opportunity 
cost.
•  The shadow price of capital (SPC) is the full price of the resource, also containing 
the external impacts. This tries to price the profit generated by the respective 
investment for the entire society, e.g. by preventing a kind of pollution, flood, 
etc. (Liu 2011).
Of these methods, the shadow price of capital and the social opportunity cost are 
clearly descriptive methods. Normative attempts can be observed for the definition 
of the social time preference rate, as it will be presented when we discuss the 
Ramsey formula.
3.4. Expert enquiries
Weitzman (1998, 2001) elaborated a method – later referred to as gamma 
discounting – to resolve the contradictions related to the discounting of projects 
useful for society, which has gained ground in the social project valuation of 
several countries. In the distant future, the degree of all factors influencing the 
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discount rate, and thus the degree of the growth rate as well, is uncertain. The 
further away the future is, the smaller discount rate is proposed by Weitzman, i.e. 
the discount rate is not constant, but rather changes by periods. In fact, by using 
a declining discount rate (DDR) this approach tries to adjust the mathematics of 
discounting. By using lower or even close to zero discount rate for longer periods, 
it can be avoided that the future values become very small and thereby negligible. 
Weitzman substantiated the definition of the discount rate by expert enquiry 
(Freeman – Groom 2015).
3.5. Evaluation of the procedures used for the definition of the descriptive 
discount rate from an ethical point of view
Clearly, establishing the weight used for considering the effect of our actions 
on future generations is essentially a question of ethics. Those using descriptive 
methods seemingly circumvent this problem, but even with this they proclaim 
that their preference is the status quo, i.e. the situation is good when it somehow 
corresponds to the present and future deducible from the historic trends. According 
to this approach, the discount rate must be somehow aligned with the interest rate 
level currently observed in the capital markets or with future, expected interest 
rate level connected to historic trends, with return expectations, values calculated 
based on some sort of market prices, or perhaps with the discounting patterns of 
human agents.
Several arguments can be brought forward against the descriptive position. The 
first counter-argument highlights the epistemological constraints of the descriptive 
method – how to define the method of determining the descriptive discount rate 
in a “normative way”, if even the participants of the economy do not know what 
would be “optimal”, since in fact it changes from company to company or from 
project to project even in the same market environment (Szűcs 2014; Jagannathan 
et al. 2016).
If the social discount rate is determined on the basis of the discounting practice used 
in the competitive market for projects with short-term horizons, it raises additional 
methodological questions. The models based on which the descriptive discount rate 
is established overly simplify the real business and social processes. These results 
are used e.g. in Great Britain or in France in a normative way for real investment 
calculations (HM Treasury 2003). The most disputable part of the simplification 
is that they often make no distinction between investments in private goods and 
public goods. Thus, the models implicitly assume that the allocated resources are 
mutually replaceable with each other (pl. Weitzman 2012, Groom et al. 2007). 
However, investments in public goods and private goods cannot be analysed based 
on the same profitability criteria, since a large part of the “utility” generated 
through investments in public good cannot be measured and is connected to the 
risk averse attitude, the absence of which may lead to the decay of the entire 
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society. Although we can try to measure the utility of the efforts to reduce air 
pollution by tabulating the costs of the treatment of illnesses thus avoided, in this 
case we do not consider the better general conditions and “quality of life” of those 
not falling ill directly, or the habitats that are not devastated, for example by acid 
rain. Dams must be adjusted to the highest water-level of the last one-hundred 
years even if precipitation decreases in the future and the likelihood of a very large 
flood is small. The future “utility” generated through the cash flows invested in 
the production of private goods, which can be measured by monetary incomes, 
cannot be compared with the “utility” generated by investments for the production 
of public goods, which often span over generations. Despite the above seemingly 
reasonable arguments, the separation of public goods and private goods becomes 
increasingly difficult in practice. Education, healthcare and defence – usually listed 
as the classic public goods – today increasingly tend to be classified as private 
goods. Whether a particular goods, e.g. clean air, is regarded as public or private 
goods, today is mostly based on social consensus (Malkin – Vildavsky 1991). While 
in China it is only the middle class that can afford clean air in Beijing by operating 
air purifier equipment installed in private homes, in the European Union – today 
still – it is a basic human right, the breach of which is sanctioned.
If we wish to set out from the discounting habits of human agents, the question is 
not only whose discounting habits we take into consideration and how we obtain the 
data and based on which principles we make conclusions with regard to a discount 
rate. We also need to address the problem of rationality. Hyperbolic discounting 
habits, when people make decisions in respect of their own life, were analysed by 
a large number of tests. However, these decisions differ from each other not only at 
the level of the individuals: they are also not consistent over time, as the reference 
point for discounting may change in each new moment. Hence, the conclusion that 
the results thus obtained cannot serve as methodological basis for rational decisions 
appears to be acceptable (cf. Rambaud – Torrecillas 2006). On the other hand, it 
is also not acceptable in ethical terms, if in the course of influencing the present 
and future society we use a method that focuses on individual selfishness instead 
of the interests of society. This latter statement is based on the ethical maxim, 
according to which the economy must serve society (Odum 1983; Tainter 1988), 
and when making technological investment decisions, the most important factor 
to be considered is the long-term survival of mankind (Jonas 1984).
The “normative application” of the descriptive rate alone raises a severe 
philosophical problem, which is dealt with by Hume’s law. Hume (1739) notes that 
deducting “what ought to be” from “what is” in fact is a methodological error, since 
the moral commands thus obtained lack a suitable logical basis. Hume’s law also 
serves as methodological basis for ethical analyses. Accordingly, the application of 
descriptive discounting not only has epistemological constraints, as there are also 
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ethical reasons against making the application of a currently postulated discount 
rate based on any particular observation mandatory in long-term projects with an 
effect on the unforeseeable future.
3.6. Discount rate determined on the basis of ethical considerations
The ethical frameworks are differentiated on the basis of the decision rules used 
for deciding what is good and what is bad. The two most important classic ethical 
schools are deontology and consequentialism. Both of these ethics focus on human 
acts and the evaluation thereof. In the case of deontology, the emphasis is on the 
intention of the acting agent, since at the moment of the decision we do not know 
what the consequence of the act will be. In the case of intertemporal decisions, 
deontology does not offer a proper practical basis for valuation. The decision rule 
of the deontology is generalisation. The perception of good and bad is based on 
whether there is a general moral maxim, applicable to all, which can be used in 
the given situation (Kant 1995). In the case of discounting, it is difficult to imagine 
such a norm, to be observed under any circumstances (categorical imperative). 
Although the philosophers researching the principles of deontology do deal with 
our responsibilities towards other living creatures or people living in the future, 
this is primarily a static philosophy that is unable to manage events of a long time 
horizon, which may also impact several generations, as it focuses on the moment 
of decision (Hampicke 2011).
On the other hand, according to the consequentialism, it is the consequence of the 
action rather than the intention, of which we may make an ethical judgement, i.e. 
declare it good or bad. In consequentialism, we can specify a variety of benchmarks 
and measure the consequence depending on whether the freedom of the society 
or the stakeholders increases or decreases (Gaus 2012). We can examine how the 
respective action affects the happiness of the individual, the stakeholders, the entire 
society or all people living and to be born (Sinnot-Armstrong 2015). It is no accident 
that, in terms of ethical frameworks, it is the concepts of consequentialism that 
we can rely on when examining how today’s decisions impact future generations. 
The ethical judgement as to whether discounting and the selection of the discount 
rate is good or bad can be pronounced based on the future consequences of the 
investments deemed viable by today’s discounting methods, i.e. how today’s 
generations and future generations share the burdens and the benefits (Broome 
1994; Sen 1973).
Of the schools of utilitarianism, which belongs to consequence-based ethics, 
classic cardinal utilitarianism and discounted utilitarianism deal with discounting 
(Gollier 2011; Greaves 2017). Cardinal utilitarianism assumes that joy and utility, 
the economic equivalent of joy, are measurable and can be expressed as individual 
preferences (e.g. Jevons 1911). Harsányi (1955) explains that individuals are able 
to compare the utility realisable through certain choices also between each other, 
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and the basis of such comparison is the inductive arguing based on facts, rather 
than a subjective feeling based on some kind of psychological basis. Discounted 
utilitarianism and the various schools thereof already more or less make allowances 
for conflicts of interest between different generations (Greaves 2017), with Ramsey 
being one of the very first advocate of this.
Setting out from the utilitarian positions dealing with discounting, we can arrive 
at two completely contradicting results: according to classic cardinal utilitarianism 
discounting must be avoided, thus for example in the context of climate change we 
should renounce our present consumption to ease the burden of future generations. 
According to discounted utilitarianism, discounting is our moral obligation and we 
should hardly deal with the future and particularly with our descendants in the 
distant future (Greaves 2017). In the following, we present through the analysis 
of the Ramsey formula the considerations that may lead to these two opposite 
ethical positions.
4. The Ramsey formula
The baseline of the discussion related to long-term discounting, applicable to 
the unforeseeable future – which caused increasing excitement from the end of 
the 1960s – is Ramsey’s 1928 paper on the mathematical theory of savings (for 
a summary of the dispute, see e.g. Arrow et al. 2012; Gollier 2011). This paper 
focuses on the question how much a society needs to save to maximise its welfare 
for a very long time, i.e. “forever”. Ramsey’s model sets out from a closed society, 
first created by a single immortal consumer, who controls the factors of production 
and consumes the produced goods on his own, and would like to save as much that 
ensures maximum utility both in the present and in the future. To achieve this, he 
must keep marginal utility at a constant level, i.e. in the case of consuming each 
new unit of product the same utility must be attributed to consumption. For this 
very reason, one of Ramsey’s benchmark assumptions is that during consumption 
marginal utility does not grow to infinity, but rather converges to a certain limit 
(the greatest happiness achievable). Later on, Ramsey resolves the concept of 
single consumer, and impersonates this in successive generations, when the single 
individuals are concerned with their own and their heirs’ profit.
In the model, Ramsey differentiates the discounting of utility and the discounting 
of cash flows. While in the latter case the discount rate corresponds to the interest 
rate, in the case of utility various people may have different utility concepts, and 
this heterogeneity is reflected by the size of the discount rate applied to the utility. 
Ramsey talks about a society, essentially divided into two groups, where people 
– or rather the immortal families – will become rich or poor depending on their 
patience or their capability of renouncing current consumption to invest the savings 
so accumulated.
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From Ramsey’s model the rate applied to the discounting of cash flows (rather than 
the individual utilities), i.e. the desirable interest rate level, can be deduced from 
the following equation, referred to as the Ramsey formula:
r = δ + ηg
Where the rate in the given moment of time is determined by three factors:
•  δ = pure social time preference rate
•  η = elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption
•  g = growth rate of consumption per capita.
The size of r so determined returns the interest rate level expected from the 
investment financed from savings, and which ensures the maintenance of social 
welfare in the case of the intertemporal decisions. Accordingly, in order to maximise 
utility in the present and future society, we need to use the same value also as the 
discount rate (Greaves 2017).
The Ramsey formula is often used for the valuation of investments that the society is 
compelled to make in order to preserve its welfare in the future as well, but do not 
offer a return under market circumstances. Thus the Ramsey formula substantiates 
the already mentioned, widely used method of determining the social discount rate. 
The r – renamed as social time preference rate (STPR) – shows the amount which 
the present society is willing to renounce in order to ensure the consumption of 
future generations (Tabi – Csutora 2011).
The definition of the individual parameters of the Ramsey formula reveals the 
individuals’ ideas of the future and whose interests they consider in making 
intertemporal decisions.
4.1. Pure social time preference
Pure social time preference is the parameter in respect of which there are a variety 
of opinions. Today this parameter is interpreted as the “measure of the impatience” 
of successive generations (Tabi – Csutora 2000), indicating to what degree we are 
willing to renounce current consumption to the benefit of the future generation. 
By contrast, Fisher (1930) believes that the impatience of the society and/or of 
the individual is expressed by the complete Ramsey formula. The pure social 
time preference is to be combined with the expected growth per capita, which 
– according to the classic theory – leads to a decrease in the marginal utility of 
consumption.
The above interpretation of the pure social time preference detracts from Ramsey’s 
original definition. Ramsey interprets pure social time preference as the function 
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of utility rather than of the cash flow (Ramsey 1928:288). This parameter is zero 
for Ramsey, because it is not possible to compare the utility of people living in 
different periods or, in the context of single individuals, the utility perceived today 
with the utility perceived later. For this reason, it is not acceptable in ethical terms 
if preference is given to the utility of any generation over the other.
While Ramsey’s view that the value of the pure social time preference is zero is based 
on epistemological presumption, later authors (e.g. Cline 1992; Dasgupta 2008; 
Gollier 2011) explain this by impartiality and the equality of generations, as utility 
should not be differentiated depending on when and which generation enjoys 
it. Let us think of the utility provided by public goods, such as clean air, forests 
or unpolluted rivers. It should be mentioned that Stern (2006) also believes that 
we must not put our welfare before that of future generations. Thus, the result 
of the zero social time preference is that only growth and the marginal utility of 
consumption influence the discount rate.
What could be the arguments for a positive pure social time preference rate, i.e. for 
putting today’s utility before that of the future? That is, what could justify the lack 
of impartiality in the case of intertemporal decisions? The most obvious argument 
is that we are going to die, and since this increases the possibility of not benefiting 
from the future utility created through our savings, we should ultimately give our 
own generation preference. This argument can be substantiated based on the 
principle of maximising the utility between the single individuals. The pure time 
preference rate adjusted for life expectancy increases the parameter’s value by the 
mortality ratio. If life expectancy deteriorates, it increases the value of the time 
preference, while if it improves, it reduces it (Pearce – Ulph 1995).
According to the second argument, ensuring the welfare of the successive 
generations requires us to make huge sacrifices. According to Arrow (1999), all 
generations are selfish, and for this reason we cannot expect them to renounce 
their present consumption for the benefit of the next (also selfish) generation, to 
maximise the utility of all generations succeeding them. Although this does not 
preclude the consideration of the next generations’ interests, it results in a pure time 
preference rate higher than zero. If we think about an investment that produces 
profit in the long run, spanning over generations, such as e.g. – according to Arrow 
(1999) – the Hoover dam, the generations that enjoy the benefits of this investment 
are put at an advantage over the members of the generation from the savings of 
which the investment was financed. Those who enjoy the benefits provided by the 
dam later may even decrease the degree of their own savings, and thus they are put 
at an advantage over the previous and the next generations. This train of thoughts 
is in line with the utilitarian approach, as the retaliation applied upon the individual 
generations (in the form of discounting) within the given framework, makes an 
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attempt to reduce their benefit deriving from selfishness and thus it spreads the 
utility among more people, making the distribution thereof more even.
4.2. Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption
The elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption reflects that we assess 
the utility of each future additional unit of consumption depending on our own 
welfare. Expressed in cash flows: receiving 100 forints means much less for a rich 
man than for a poor one. Since this is a ratio, if the elasticity of the marginal utility 
is 1, one per cent additional consumption will generate the same utility both for the 
poor and the rich man. (Of course, when expressed in absolute value, the values 
differ; each additional consumption of 1 forint represents the same utility for a poor 
man with 100 forints, as the additional consumption of 10 forint for a rich man 
with 1,000 forints.) If this ratio exceeds 1, it means that it brings less profit for the 
rich man if his consumption grows by as many percents as that of the poor man. 
This correlation is Gossen’s law on the decreasing marginal utility, and in fact is an 
axiomatic general condition, which is usually illustrated by analogies such as: if I 
already have a house/apple, car etc. in the future I will have much less benefit if 
I get one more of that than if I did not have it, and thus it is unlikely that it makes 
sense to save today to enjoy the benefit thereof in the future. This axiom appears 
to be plausible in the case of consumer goods within a single generation, i.e. in 
respect of the decisions of an individual determining his own future.
If the value of the consumption marginal utility exceeds one, it means that – if 
the other factors are constant and growth is positive – the discount rate will be 
higher. Thus, this parameter can be also interpreted as a guarantee for the equal 
distribution between present and future consumption, which shows the degree of 
intertemporal inequality aversion (Gollier – Hammit 2014). According to Arrow et 
al. (2004), this parameter ensures equitableness between generations.
There are intertemporal decisions that determine the future state of nature for 
example and reduce the effect of climate change. Why would it represent a smaller 
benefit for a rich man than for a poor one if the extinction of certain species of 
animals or plants, e.g. polar bears, can be prevented (Frederick 2006)? The rich 
are usually much more willing to support such projects than the poor. Based on 
the analogy of the above train of thought, it would also follow from this that for 
them it represents higher utility if they can benefit from the natural resources in 
the future as well, than for the poor (Revesz – Shahabian 2011). Thus, if we prefer 
present consumption instead of investing in projects that preserve the services 
provided by nature, it is possible that the future generation will appreciate scarce 
and disappearing natural resources much more than we do at present, and thus in 
the case of such projects the parameter must be less than on in the case of positive 
growth per capita in order to reduce the value of the discount rate.
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4.3. Growth rate of consumption per capita
The seemingly most exact parameter of the Ramsey formula is the growth rate of 
consumption per capita. If we ignore the other parameters, i.e. the value of the pure 
time preference rate is zero and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is 
one, the discount rate is determined solely by the growth rate.
Economists usually assume a positive growth rate in the long run. The source of 
growth is capital accumulation and technological change (Pearce – Ulph 1995). 
Based on retrospective data, going back 100–180 years, this value is estimated for 
Great Britain to be 1.3–1.6 (OXERA 2002). If we accept this value also in relation to 
the future long-term growth rate, it is easy to justify the discounted utilitarianism. 
Since our objective is to ensure the optimal – i.e. most even – distribution of the 
benefit of the investment between the generations, discounting is unavoidable. 
Without discounting, the present generations renounce their consumption to 
ensure that the future generations which become rich through the growth of the 
economy become even richer. As it is noted by Baumol (1968), this is a “reverse 
Robin Hood” measure, as in 100 years the average income per capita may be several 
times higher (in real terms) than today, so why should we renounce part of our 
income to give it to those more affluent than us.
On the other hand, if the growth rate is zero, we have no right to discount, since 
with discounting we make the future generations poorer. According to Broomer 
(1994), a believer in cardinal utilitarianism, particularly in the context of climate 
change discounting cannot be justified, as the impacts thereof will be mostly felt by 
the poor countries. Those who are more willing to invest today in the reduction of 
the emission of greenhouse gases, are the rich countries with developed industry, 
while the poor, underdeveloped countries that will feel the impact of climate change 
the most, will be poorer even in the future than today’s developed countries.
The dispute between the two opinions (cf. e.g. Sen 1973 and Pearce – Ulph 1995) is 
not the result of the questioning of the utilitarian principles based on equality and 
impartiality, but rather of the different construction of the authors’ world model. 
While Sen (1973) deems the individual generations to be homogenous, Broome 
(1994) expands the issue of discounting over generations with the inequalities 
within the generations. If both the present and future generations comprise of the 
poor and the rich, it is indeed questionable how today’s rich relate to the future’s 
poor. This problem appears even if economic growth is positive. If we make major 
investments that relieve the future generation of the impacts of climate change, we 
have two options: withdraw the necessary funds from the poor or from the rich. If 
from the rich, the argumentation of Broome (1994) may be valid. But if the price 
of these investments is that we spend less for the elimination of the inequalities 
within the generations due to reducing the investments and aids in the individual 
countries and those directed to the developed countries, the reference to reverse 
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Robin Hood becomes valid. Namely, in the future generations the poor will become 
less poor by exploiting the less affluent members of the present generations.
However, if the growth rate of the consumption per capita is negative, there will 
be an interesting situation where the discount rate becomes negative. However, 
the literature deals with this possibility only marginally. According to Weitzman 
(2009), in those cases when there is a very high risk of an imminent disaster, it is 
justified to use all resources of the present for the prevention thereof. In the model 
where he proves this thesis, he examines consumption as a function of the rising 
temperature of the Earth. If we examine the hypothetical situation when due to 
the extremely high temperature consumption falls to the minimal, the negative 
discount rate should also converge to the infinite.
Whether GDP is an appropriate measure of the long-term growth or “social utility” 
– not to mention happiness – generates rather strong disputes. Extreme weather 
conditions, disasters, floods and forest fires, which are becoming increasingly 
frequent in the course of climate change, and the dramatic fall in the growth rate 
of the agricultural average yields observed in the long run, accompanying the rise 
in temperature (Ray et al. 2013; Hatfield 2016) suggest that the economists’ belief 
in continuous and technological growth will sooner or later will come up against 
natural barriers. While in the past period monocultures, the use of chemicals, 
genetically modified organisms and agricultural technologies forcing back nature 
to smaller and smaller fragmented territories contributed to the growth in GDP, 
between 1998 and 2013 the production potential of these areas decreased 
substantially, by roughly 20 per cent (GLO 2017). As a result of urbanisation, the 
changed use of land, and at the same time making a fetish of GDP growth, there 
may be nothing left for the future generation to measure.
5. Evaluation of utilitarian discounting
Although cardinal and discounted utilitarianism are seemingly antagonistic to each 
other, in fact this antagonism is connected to the different expectations with regard 
to the future and the often opposite assumption related to economic agents. The 
benchmark assumptions of the models include the rational, profit maximising 
agent, which is immortal or mortal. When it comes down to mortal agents, they are 
clustered in successive or overlapping generations, which are either homogenous 
in terms of capital distribution and consumption, or can be divided into the rich 
and the poor.
The normative position precludes the differentiation of generations: that is, we 
prefer the present to the future (cardinal utilitarianism) or the future to the 
present (discounted utilitarianism). Setting out from this position, the decline in 
the marginal utility of consumption can be questioned in the same way when it 
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comes to the valuation of public goods, the nature or the environment, rather than 
to the consumption of private goods. The concept of “greatest happiness” is usually 
identified with “utility” in the utilitarian literature on discounting. This substitution 
represents a major leap between the absolute, numerically not measurable, concept 
of happiness and the utility notion, which can be quantified, at least in theory 
by various methods. The identification of happiness (described by Ramsey as the 
perfect but unattainable “bliss”) with the utility achievable during consumption 
is a fundamental logical error. Muddling the “utility” of the services provided by 
nature with the utility of consumption is the same sort of error.
In summary, we can state that the seemingly controversial results of utilitarian 
ethical analysis are attributable to the different interpretations of utility and/or the 
different estimation of the various parameters, primarily the future growth rate, 
impacting the discount factor.
5.1. How to discount?
For the discount rate applied in the case of investments important for society, 
a wide range of values are determined in the world. At present, in the USA discount 
rates of 3 and 7 per cent both apply to public projects (CEAI 2017), in Norway it is 
2.5 per cent for risk-free projects, declining to 1 per cent after 41 years, while in 
the Netherlands the discount rate is 0 per cent for the risk-free projects, and these 
rates are adjusted by the risk premium as necessary (Groom 2017). The discount 
rate applied in developing countries may be as high as 10–12 per cent, e.g. in 
Serbia it is 10 per cent (Djukic et al 2016). The different values are determined on 
a descriptive or prescriptive basis, or sometimes the discount rate that facilitates 
the implementation of the respective project is simply adjusted to political decisions 
(Groom 2017).
Having reviewed the procedures and philosophies determining the discounting 
methods, we found that neither utilitarian normative discounting nor observation-
based descriptive discounting (or some sort of combination of the two) resolves 
the ethical problems related to the discount rate to be applied in the case of 
intertemporal projects and they give no guidance to be followed with regard to 
the ultimate discount rate. However, the failure of utilitarian discounting does not 
mean that we need to give up the ethical dimension. If we choose human societies 
or even the entire mankind rather than the individual or generations interpreted 
as the aggregation of individual interest as the ethical benchmark shaping the 
general conditions of the model to be used for the definition of discounting, we may 
arrive at an approach that helps avoid the contradictions of the models presented 
in the study. The cases when we need to make a decision on the application of 
the social discount rate are usually long-term projects important for the entire 
society or even for mankind as a whole. These projects also include investments 
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the implementation of which is financed by the private sector, but in the future will 
substantially burden the environment.
In practice, this involves how to treat a development related to a risky technology 
or projects aimed at protecting the environment. One of the obvious possibilities 
to address these cases is the application of two types of discount rates: when 
it comes to investments where damages caused to the future generation should 
be prevented, no discounting should be applied, while in all other cases the 
determination of the discount rate should be left to the market (Davidson 2014). 
(Of course, we do discount even when no discounting is applied, but in this case 
the discount rate is zero.) Another possibility, in addition to discounting, is to take 
measures that help reduce the burdens of future generations. These measures 
should be taken by society or it should force private investors to take them. These 
may be requirements, already introduced in certain areas, which e.g. increase the 
costs of a mine opening due to the requirement to deposit collateral for the costs 
of recultivation, or measures when the respective society invests in research to 
reduce the environmental effects of a harmful technology, as well as the research 
and constructions related to the high-level radioactive waste disposal of a nuclear 
plant. No matter which of the above possibilities is implemented, we never know 
in advance whether we comply with the principle of utilitarianism, i.e. have we 
not favoured the present or future generations. This assessment, if it is possible at 
all to measure the utility generated by a public investment, always takes place ex 
post, while upon planning the investments we need to focus on the future ex ante, 
without knowing what will follow.
If we do not want to become resigned to our ethical impotence, it is worth looking 
for ethical arguments which focus on the future of human society rather than trying 
to reconcile the economic theory and the ethical opinion (Davidson 2014). The 
ethics of responsibility, as defined by Jonas (1984), states that the most important 
ethical command for all generations is to ensure the survival of mankind in such 
a way that future generations can also live a worthy life on Earth. When it comes 
to potentially hazardous technologies, we must not ignore the risks they represent 
in such a way that we increase the amount of the damage caused by a disaster, 
catastrophe or extraordinary event by the risk of the occurrence. It follows from 
this that we should forego the technologies the impact of which jeopardises the 
vital conditions of future generations. What is the consequence of this in terms of 
discounting? If we insist on the cost-benefit analysis, Weitzman’s (2009) negative 
discount rate must be used for these technologies, which also assumes that we 
do not believe that the future society will be able to eliminate the environmental 
damages that we leave to them. Eastern Europe or Hungary are good examples of 
this, where the rehabilitation of the environment damaged by the socialist industry 
has not taken place to date; just think about the hazardous waste in Garé or that 
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the recultivation of the refuse dump left over by the uranium mines was financed 
– in the absence of suitable domestic resources – by the European Union’s pre-
accession fund, the PHARE programme. These examples also show that we must not 
assume that future generations will be richer than us, as we exhaust and degrade 
the natural resources and environment through human activity in such a way that 
provides much worse general conditions for the future generation than those we 
live in today.
The presently used discounting methods and discount rates cannot be applied 
for deciding on the type of investments that can ensure the right of future 
generations to a clean environment and nature, and thereby to human dignity. 
Both the theoretical and practical problems indicate that in the future some kind of 
different discounting philosophy or different type of cost-benefit analysis method 
should be elaborated for the valuation of public investments. For this purpose, 
we may rely on – in addition to the responsibility of ethics of Jones, mentioned 
above – the philosophy of Rawls (1985), which focuses on fairness. If we fairly 
distribute the benefits and burdens between the individual generations rather 
than focusing on the utilitarian approach of utility, where we chase the “greatest 
happiness” (Bentham 1907), we change over to a different paradigm of thinking. 
In this paradigm the minimisation of damages may be more important (Popper 
1952:304) than the maximisation of welfare. The role of discounting in such a cost-
benefit analysis, introducing fairness as an axiom, is not yet clear. The elaboration 
of this in the form of policies also implementable in practice may be a research 
area for the future.
6. Summary
Discounting is apparently a financial technical operation, but in fact determining the 
discount rate is based on serious ethical and economic philosophic considerations. 
This is particularly true when it comes to discounting the cash flows of cost-
benefit analyses used for investments important for the society. In this paper, 
we summarised the most important trends in the literature on ethics related to 
discounting. We found that the descriptive discount rate, observing the individuals’ 
discounting habits or the behaviour of the agents of the private economy, is 
questionable both in terms of epistemology and ethics. The reason for this is that 
the determination of the rate is rather subjective even in the private economy. On 
the other hand, with the ethical assessment we run into Hume’s guillotine, which 
states that what we have now is not necessarily good as well. In the case of the 
prescriptive approach, the most common utilitarian approach sets out from the 
need to ensure fair distribution between the present and future generations by 
discounting. We examined certain aspects of the utilitarian approach relying on 
the Ramsey formula. We found that of the parameters specified by Ramsay, the 
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contradictions characterising the cardinal and discounted utilitarianism arise from 
the different interpretation of utility and the different estimation of the future 
growth rate. Namely, according to the cardinal utilitarianism we must not discount, 
while according to the discounted utilitarianism we must discount, if we want to 
ensure the welfare of both present and future generations. Finally, the paper deals 
with the discount rates applied in practice in the case of social investments, upon 
the substantiation of which both the descriptive and the prescriptive principles 
are relied on in the individual countries. This diversity, together with the most 
important – often contradicting – recommendations of the reviewed literature, 
show that the present discounting methods distort the cost-benefit analysis of the 
investments important for society.
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